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Abstract 
This collection of articles deals with the history and the current state of Russia’s media 
elite. It defines three groups of media elites; owners of media outlets, media managers and 
prominent journalists. All those groups are under pressure of being agreeable to the Kremlin and 
pleasing their audiences with their products and output. The Kremlin’s tightened control over the 
media forced some media professionals out, losing their jobs or emigrating. The majority, 
however, have kept their positions. They are reasonably well networked and integrated into the 
political system and successfully employ strategies partly inherited from Soviet times. The 
collection of articles provides insights into the inner working of Russian media, delivering a 
nuanced understanding of media control, censorship and self-censorship. 
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In late September 2016 the Russian daily newspaper Kommersant announced 
Oleg Dobrodeev as one of the potential candidates for the position of deputy head of the 
Presidential Administration, a highly influential position in Russia’s political hierarchy. 
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Dobrodeev is the godfather of post-Soviet television. In 1993, he set up Russia’s first 
independent television channel NTV, which he left in 2000 to head the state media holding 
VGTRK. That this gossip about Dobrodeev emerged is symbolic: it shows the extent to 
which the political and media elites in Putin’s Russia have become intertwined. 
The post-Soviet Russian media elites provide a particularly rich topic along which 
to study the evolution of elites and the role of media in semi-authoritarian states. Media 
elites in our understanding comprise roughly three groups; first, owners of sizeable media 
businesses; second, media managers and editors-in-chief; and, third, renounced 
journalists prominent enough to act as opinion makers, and sometimes even influential 
enough to push the Kremlin’s media agenda. Individuals belonging to these groups thus 
fluctuate between the outer fringes of the power elite and its inner circles. 
Many of the actors analyzed in this special issue are part of informal networks. 
Through them they gain status in society and take influence on decision-making 
processes. This shorthand for ‘system of governance’ – often called sistema, as does 
most famously the political sociologist Alena Ledeneva – keeps its members privileged 
and safe and, at the same time, under control. Three of the five articles in this special 
issue analyze, among other things, how media managers and owners have preserved, 
and partly expanded, their power through influential networks.  
The main focus of this special issue is to explore what strategies post-Soviet media 
managers and journalists have employed to become – and remain – successful. How 
have these strategies evolved and how did the biographies of those influential in the 
media develop over time, from the late Soviet period, through the 1990s to today? What 
has triggered the rise of new groups within Russia’s media elite and what the fall of 
others? What strategies have regime-critical journalists developed to survive 
professionally (and occasionally also physically)? 
The media scholar Des Freedman suggests paying special attention to how the 
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various players in the field of media power interact and how they relate to other elites.3 
Intra-elite interaction between media, politics and business has been traditionally intense 
in post-Soviet Russia. Already in the late perestroika period high-profile journalists and 
politicians worked closely together, mingled socially and provided each other mutual 
support, with liberally-minded journalists playing an important role in the break-up of the 
Soviet Union. However, subsequently many of them were quickly reintegrated into the 
new power structures, which emerged during the early 1990s. Their rapid absorption was 
facilitated by a combination of two principal influences; the pursuit of individual career 
interests and increasing institutional pressure, first exercised by media tycoons – such as 
by the oligarchs Vladimir Gusinskii and Boris Berezovskii – and then by the state. 
Moreover, the transitional character of post-Soviet Russian society meant for the media 
community that the shadow of Soviet management practices have not disappeared 
easily. 
In their article Gatov et al. show that many elements of management practices 
dominant in the Soviet media not only persisted well into the new Russia but were skillfully 
developed further. Initially, it was media managers who were professionally raised in 
Soviet times who transferred old management styles into newly established media. More 
surprisingly, younger media managers have played no less a part in reproducing Soviet-
style practices. There is a striking similarity between the relationship between the Kremlin 
and its media bosses in the Soviet Union (where rewards were offered through 
nomenklatura membership) and these relationships today (where rewards are offered in 
form of money and influence). 
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From 2012 onwards, during Putin’s third term, Russia’s regime has gained clear 
authoritarian features. So much so that today control of the media through loyal media 
elites is a crucial cornerstone of Putin’s political regime. Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 
May 2012 went along with yet another significant restructuring of Russia’s media; the 
landscape of Russian media came to be almost exclusively the domain of loyal media 
professionals ready to toe the line of their bosses. The few dissent voices critical of the 
regime’s media policy who kept working for Kremlin-loyal media outlets went on an 
internal migration to the confines of programmes devoted to culture and history, thus 
leaving political news to more ambitious media professionals. A small number of 
journalists found shelter in the few remaining oppositional media outlets.  
Some of the well-known liberally-minded journalists left the country for good. Many 
moved to Ukraine in hope to preserve their careers, or simply to stay safe. As recent 
events have shown some of these attempts were in vain. Two of the journalists Darya 
Malyutina interviewed for her research died in Kyiv; one was murdered, the other one 
(allegedly) committed suicide. For many other Russian journalists, however, emigration 
to Ukraine proved a wise decision, even though the fact that the military conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine imposed great pressure on them – as Russians – in an environment of increased 
suspicion and hostility. What has come in handy for them to succeed nevertheless is their 
long experience in terms of how to navigate journalistic independence and political 
loyalty.  
This ability to credibly play by the rules without limiting one’s professional creativity 
(something we have called adekvatnost’) is crucial for journalists and media managers 
alike. Some of the media managers we interviewed, as presented in the second article of 
this issue (Schimpfössl & Yablokov), have shown exceptional flexibility. They are highly 
capable of ‘correctly’ navigating permanently changing political environments. In many 
cases, this experience goes back several decades. Some media managers have led their 
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media outlets from the first years of post-Soviet Russia, others even from the late Soviet 
period, weathering the most radical changes from the Soviet communist system, the 
Yeltsin years turbulences, through to Putin’s growing authoritarianism.  
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the military operation in Eastern 
Ukraine have signified a major turning point in the regime’s evolution. Many observers of 
Russian media have noted that state-aligned channels quickly evolved into a propaganda 
machine, whilst among Western observers and journalists Russian television and 
Russian journalists began to be perceived as a serious security threat. The economic 
sanctions imposed by the US and the EU were meant to undermine the legitimacy of 
Putin’s cronies by putting additional constraints on Russia’s economy. Instead, as Ilya 
Kiriya demonstrates, the sanctions have had an adverse effect to what the Western 
governments intended to achieve; they have empowered the state-aligned media players 
in the market to gain control of previously independent companies and thus further boost 
their influence and increase their profits and undermine the survival of the few non-
Kremlin-loyal media in Russia.  
What makes the media sector particularly interesting is its specific position in 
between interaction between society, power structures and other elite groups as well as 
new technologies that force all players to stay alert and adapt. Gregory Asmolov and 
Polina Kolozaridi trace the making and shaping of Russia’s Internet leaders in the last 
two decades. The authors see the Internet in Russia (known as RuNet) as a social 
construction which illustrates the power relations between various political actors. 
According to Asmolov and Kolozaridi, the evolution of Russia’s Internet elites went 
through five stages since the late Soviet period. Enthusiastic scientists, while still under 
Soviet control, set up RuNet (stage 1). This paved the way for a rapidly growing Internet 
landscape in the 1990s (stage 2). In the 2000s, RuNet provided a platform for alternative 
media to prosper, attracting active civic participation (stage 3), which in the 2010s further 
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developed into a tool to organize offline civic mobilization (stage 4). After Putin’s return 
to the Kremlin RuNet came under complete state control (stage 5).  
This special issue cannot by any means cover all aspects of the phenomenon of 
post-Soviet media elites. Amidst the increased attention to the impact the Russian media 
have on the global political agenda – via the alleged cyber hacks of the US government 
institutions or RT’s coverage of domestic politics in the Western democratic states – it is 
especially crucial to further explore the inner workings of the Russian media. Their 
present-day problems, especially the media’s evolution into a propaganda tool, go far 
beyond the constraints the Putin regime exercises. On the one hand, the media’s 
limitations are far more complex and historically more deeply rooted. On the other hand, 
the media professionals’ potential, diversity and, in some cases, civic consciousness are 
far greater than often assumed. Moreover, media do not exist in isolation. As much as 
the Kremlin’s objective is to maintain legitimacy and control through media, as much the 
media elite is under pressure to be seen as acceptable, interesting and legitimate by their 
audiences. As such, an analysis of Russia’s media elite’s features can also shed light on, 
and give hints at, how Russia will be developing in a post-Putin age.    
